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Abstract
Since the last 30 years, the economy has been undergoing a massive digital transformation. Intangible
digital assets, like software solutions, web services, and more recently deep learning algorithms, artificial
intelligence and digital platforms, have been increasingly adopted thanks to the diffusion and advancements
of information and communication technologies. Various observers argue that we could rapidly approach
a technological singularity leading to explosive economic growth. The contribution of this paper is on the
empirical and the modelling side. First, we present a cross-country empirical analysis assessing the correlation
between intangible digital assets and different measures of productivity. Then we figure out their long-term
impact on unemployment under different scenarios by means of an agent-based macro-model.
Keywords: Intangible assets, Digital transformation, Total factor productivity, Technological
unemployment, Agent-based economics
1. Introduction
In his 1930 lecture “Economic possibilities for our grandchildren”, John Maynard Keynes predicted
that in one hundred years from then, i.e. around 2030, the production problem would be solved and
there would be enough for everyone but machines would cause “technological unemployment”. McKinsey
Global Institute in a recent report1 stated that the increasing adoption of automation technologies, including
artificial intelligence and robotics, will generate significant benefits for the economy, raising productivity and
economic growth, but with a far-reaching impact on the global workforce. In particular, according to the
study, around half of current work activities are subject to be technically automatable by adapting current
available technologies and, by 2030, 75 million to 375 million workers will be displaced by automation with
the need to change occupation to avoid unemployment.
Brian Arthur, one of the pioneers in studying the economics of the digital age, recently stated2 that
we have reached or are close to the above-mentioned “Keynes point”, i.e. a new economic era where we
are witnessing the “third morphing” of the digital revolution. In particular, while the first morphing in the
70s/80s was characterized by the microchip and the availability of cheap digital calculus, the second morphing
in the 90s/00s by the widespread diffusion of computer networks, the third morphing is bringing intelligent
machines. The combination of computers, sensors, big data and statistical learning techniques, provides
machines characterized by the sort of associative intelligence typical of biological beings, then potentially
able to substitute humans in a large set of activities.
The key element of intelligent machines is software, i.e. the collection and combination of procedures,
instructions and algorithms that set machines and computers behaviour based on environment and input.
Email addresses: filippo.bertani@edu.unige.it (Filippo Bertani), marco.raberto@unige.it (Marco Raberto),
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1McKinsey Global Institute, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation, December 2017.
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Software is an intangible good which is non-rivalrous since it is characterized by zero (or quasi zero) marginal
costs. Arthur has investigated since the 80s the economic features of software and generally of intangible
digital technologies as well as their effects for business and the economy as whole, see Arthur (1989, 1990,
1994, 1996). In particular, he pointed out the existence of two different economic realities: the so-called
diminishing and increasing returns world. The former is represented by traditional mass-production systems
whose products require a huge amount of resources and a relatively lower contribution of knowledge, whereas
the latter is represented by high-tech companies such as digital technologies producers: their products are
characterized by a high knowledge content and a scarce quantity of resources. Several economic features
distinguish increasing returns business worlds from traditional bulk-production worlds. Arthur mentions
network effects, positive feedback, path dependence, winner-takes-most/-takes-all outcomes, and then tech-
nological lock-in. In particular, positive feedbacks reinforce market position of growing companies and, at
the same time, negatively affect producers with declining market share.
In the age of intelligent machines and digital automation, software, databases, artificial intelligence
algorithms, and any other sort of intangible digital technologies are playing an increasingly dominant role with
a far-reaching impact on the working of our economies. A recent popular book by Haskel and Westlake (2017)
emphasizes the increasing weight of intangible investments in the economy and analyses its consequences.
In particular, the authors point out the four main features that characterize intangible goods, the so-called
four “S”: scalability, sunk costs, spillovers, synergies. Scalability is related to the non-rivalrous property
of intangible goods and their zero (or quasi zero) marginal costs, see also Rifkin (2014). Usually, firms
producing this type of goods face high fixed costs, generally given by research and/or development costs,
compared to their variable production costs. Furthermore, most of times, intangible investments represent
sunk costs. A typical example is made by software realized for specific firms and purposes; although this
software represents an asset for them, in case of exit from the market, it is very difficult to recover the
initial investment. Intangible investments tend to generate spillover since it may be difficult or expensive
to protect new knowledge generation and other companies can benefit copying or imitating new ideas.
Finally, the combination of different intangible assets together (or with hardware) spurs innovations, e.g. at
organizational level, that can increase companies’ profitability. In other words, synergies create value for
firms and, in the “intangible economy”, the willingness to increase their revenues have led to the so-called
“open innovation”. This fact assumes a crucial importance because, from a wider perspective, the nature of
technological innovation and progress can be interpreted as based on synergies between different and existing
technologies, as argued by Arthur (2009).
It is worth noting that non-rivalrous digital assets do not cover all intangible investments, which include
also other relevant assets, like patents, organizational innovations, or investments in marketing and brand.
However, in the era of intelligent machines and digital automation, software, databases and artificial intelli-
gence algorithms clearly deserve the highest attention among the different kinds of intangible investments.
Building on the pioneering insights of Arthur and on the recent empirical investigation and theorizing
by Haskel and Westlake (2017), the main contribution of this study is to enrich and complete the previous
empirical work on the relation between different measures of productivity and intangible investments. In
particular, we are considering a higher number of countries and different kinds of intangible investments, also
in combination with tangible investments in information and communication technologies. In addition, we
elaborate on the long-standing issue of technological unemployment, in sight of the novelty of digital automa-
tion. To this purpose, we discuss a recent contribution of the large-scale agent-based Eurace macro model
to study the impact of intangible digital assets to the unemployment level and macroeconomic performance,
see Bertani et al. (2019).
The paper is organized as follows. A technological unemployment literature review is presented in Section
2. The empirical analysis concerning productivities and investments is provided in Section 3. Section 4
presents the extension of the Eurace model that includes investments in intangible digital assets in order to
study their effects on the economy, in particular on productivity and unemployment. Concluding remarks
are shown in Section 5.
2
2. Technological unemployment in the digital age
Several economists divide technological progress outcomes into short and long term effects, see Mokyr
et al. (2015). Technological progress is usually linked to three different outcomes3: product, process, or-
ganizational and marketing innovation (the latter two types are usually considered as non-technological
innovations, however they are strictly influenced by technological developments and related to the other in-
novation kinds, see Pianta (2009); Monteiro et al. (2019)). Whereas the potential beneficial impact deriving
from product innovation is underpinned by several studies, see e.g. Edquist et al. (2001); Vivarelli and Pianta
(2000), process innovation presents a labour-saving nature allowing to produce the same amount of output
with a reduced quantity of workforce. In the case of case product innovation new markets could be opened
increasing production and employment levels, while in the case od process innovation the higher efficiency
related to the introduction of new technologies determines a higher productivity which in turn can lead to
lower employment, see Pianta (2009). However, according to the so-called “theory of compensation”, the
technological progress itself triggers different compensation mechanisms that countervail technological unem-
ployment deriving from process innovation, see Petit (1993). As highlighted by Vivarelli (2014), six different
economic forces counteracting the process innovation labour-saving effect can be distinguished, namely the
compensation mechanism “via decrease in prices”, “via decrease in wages”, “via new investment”, “via new
products”, “via new machines” and “via additional income”. All these six mechanisms contribute to coun-
terbalance the negative effects on employment caused by technological progress. However, not all economists
have been completely optimist and confident about this compensation mechanisms, see Piva and Vivarelli
(2017).
Until the end of the XXth century, most of innovations introduced within production processes allowed
to produce mechanical energy, helping workers to overcome the limits imposed by physical force. Nowadays,
according to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), a technological revolution, called “The Second Machine Age”,
will radically affect the economic system. Digital technologies, represented by robotics, automation, software
and artificial intelligence (AI) might be able to surmount the limits imposed by human mind.
A considerable part of economists argues that, thanks to the compensation mechanisms, digital tech-
nologies will not have a deep impact on employment. In this respect, according to Vermeulen et al. (2018),
automation is determining only a typical structural change rather than the so-called “end of work”. On the
other hand, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 2018a,b,c,d) argue that the only effective way able to counterbal-
ance the “displacement effect” created by robotics, automation and AI is represented by the creation of new
labour-intensive tasks, as the productivity effect, the capital accumulation and the deepening of automation
are not able to absorb the disruptive impact of digital technologies.
Various economists and technologists hypothesized that mankind could rapidly approach a technological
singularity: AI may become even self-improving, see Good (1966); Nordhaus (2015); Aghion et al. (2017). In
this respect, technological unemployment target could change from “blue collars” to “white collars” workers.
Empirical studies on labour market have shown a job polarization not completely consistent with the so-
called “skill-biased technical change”, see Goos and Manning (2007); Goos et al. (2014); Autor and Dorn
(2013). Indeed, since the end of the XXth century, the advent of new digital technologies led to a decrease
in the demand of mid-range workers performing routine manual and cognitive tasks and, at the same time,
to an increase in demand of high salary non-routine cognitive jobs and low salary non-routine manual jobs.
This phenomenon could be considered as a compensation mechanisms, and it is worth questioning if it will
continue to work after the disruptive advent of enhanced-performance AI.
The increasing importance of digital technologies is also shown by digital platforms, like Amazon, Deliv-
eroo, Glovo, Foodora and Uber, which are typical examples of non rivalrous services that have considerably
affected our economic system both from employment and working condition perspective, see Kenney and
Zysman (2019). The so-called “digital taylorism” has emerged, where platforms’ algorithms are able to
control, to evaluate and to organize labour activities. Moreover, as in the case of Foodora or Uber, some au-
thors argue that entrepreneurial risk has been transferred from companies to workers, see Dosi and Virgillito
3https://www.oecd.org/site/innovationstrategy/defininginnovation.htm
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(2019).
3. The impact on productivity: an empirical assessment
The role of intangible investments in our economy is becoming increasingly important over time. In fact,
intangible investments have surpassed tangible ones in certain markets, as for example in the United Kingdom
(UK), see Goodridge et al. (2012). Besides software and databases, other kinds of intangible investments are
represented for example by investments in R&D, design and engineering, mineral exploration, brands and
advertising, see Thum-Thysen et al. (2017); Corrado et al. (2005).
As far as digital technologies are concerned, Fig. 1 shows several time series4 representing the ratio
between intangible investments in software and database and gross value added (GVA) for various countries.
Except for Italy (IT) and Luxembourg (LU), see Fig. 1(b) and (c) respectively, these investments increased
between 1997 and 2014; in particular Netherlands (NL), France (FR) and Sweden (SW) have experienced the
hugest enhancement. This shows the growing importance that digital assets have in our economic system.
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Figure 1: The figure shows various time series representing the trend between 1997 and 2014 of ratio between software and
database intangible investments and gross value added for several countries. Time series have been elaborated by authors using
EU-KLEMS data and they are organized in sub-figure according to their values: in Fig. 1 (a) time series with highest values
are displayed and in Fig. 1 (d) time series with lowest ones; in Fig. 1 (b) and (c) time series with intermediate values are
reported. The analysis has been made by authors using EU-KLEMS data (www.euklems.net).
Along the line of Haskel and Westlake (2017), we have carried out a correlation analysis in order to
investigate the relation among different measures of productivity and types of investment. Our study takes
into account a larger number of countries and it is focused on a longer time period of eighteen years, from
1997 to 2014. We split this time span in a pre and post crisis time period, i.e., from 1997 to 2007 and from
2008 to 2014. The fifteen countries considered are: Italy (IT), Germany (DE), Netherlands (NL), United
Kingdom (UK), United States (USA), France (FR), Sweden (SW), Spain (ES), Denmark (DK), Portugal
(PT), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Ireland (IE), Greece (GR) and Luxembourg (LU).
Moreover, while Haskel and Westlake (2017) productivity-investments correlation analysis focused mainly
on total factor productivity (TFP), we extend the analysis to different measures of productivity, namely
labour productivity PL (measured as GDP per hour worked) and capital productivity PK (measured as the
ratio between GDP and capital services). As for investments, we consider the following investment items:
4Time series are made by authors using EU-KLEMS data (www.euklems.net) and have been filtered through a Ho-
drick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 10.
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• Total intangible investments (Tot Int): they represent the sum of R&D, software, databases, mineral
exploration and artistic originals investments;
• Intangible investments in software and database (Int Soft&DB);
• Intangible investments in R&D (Int R&D);
• Total tangible investments (Tot Tang): they represent the sum of ICT equipment, transportation
equipment, cultivated assets, non-residential structures, other machinery equipment and weapons in-
vestments. We do not consider investments in residential structures because the research focuses on
those investments that generate productive assets.
• Tangible investments in ICT equipment (Tang ICT).
• Tangible investments in ICT equipment together with intangible investments in software and databases
(ICT&Soft&DB). The combination of these investments turns out to be crucial because of the intrinsic
complementarity characterizing hardware and software. In fact, hardware is useless without software
and viceversa. Therefore, combining these investments we can assess the real importance that digital
technologies have in our society.
The correlation analysis has been performed combining the EU-KLEMS (www.euklems.net) database,
which provided information about investment, and the OECD (www.oecd.org) database for information on
productivity.
Table 1: The table shows the correlation coefficients and p-values (in brackets) between the sets of country time averages of
different kinds of investments and productivities growth rates. Time averages refer to three different time periods: 1997-2007,
2008-2014, 1997-2014. They have been considered three types of productivity (total factor productivity (TFP), labour produc-
tivity (PL) and capital productivity (PK)) and four types of investment (total intangible investments, intangible investments
in software and database, total tangible investments (without considering dwellings investments) and tangible investments in
ICT). Significant results have been pointed out with asterisks: a single asterisk is used when p-values are lower than 0.1 whereas
two and three asterisks are used when p-values are lower than 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The analysis takes into account fifteen
countries (IT, DE, NL, UK, USA, FR, SW, ES, DK, PT, AT, FI, IE, GR, LU) and it has been realized using EU-KLEMS
(www.euklems.net) and OECD (www.oecd.org) data.
1997-2007 2008-2014 1997-2014
TFP - Tot Int 0.082 (0.77) 0.81*** (0.0003) 0.46* (0.081)
PL - Tot Int 0.21 (0.45) 0.79*** (0.0006) 0.67*** (0.0065)
PK - Tot Int -0.44 (0.1) 0.17 (0.54) -0.37 (0.18)
TFP - Int Soft&DB 0.44 (0.11) 0.018 (0.95) 0.29 (0.29)
PL - Int Soft&DB 0.47* (0.079) 0.22 (0.43) 0.5* (0.058)
PK - Int Soft&DB 0.11 (0.68) -0.38 (0.16) -0.29 (0.29)
TFP - Int R&D 0.041 (0.89) 0.62** (0.014) 0.3 (0.28)
PL - Int R&D 0.2 (0.47) 0.6** (0.019) 0.59** (0.02)
PK - Int R&D -0.53** (0.043) 0.07 (0.81) -0.58** (0.025)
TFP - Tot Tang 0.26 (0.35) 0.54** (0.037) 0.53** (0.044)
PL - Tot Tang 0.31 (0.26) 0.32 (0.24) 0.51* (0.05)
PK - Tot Tang -0.042 (0.88) 0.41 (0.13) 0.087 (0.76)
TFP - Tang ICT 0.31 (0.27) 0.63** (0.012) 0.34 (0.22)
PL - Tang ICT 0.2 (0.48) 0.43 (0.109) 0.22 (0.44)
PK - Tang ICT 0.25 (0.38) 0.48* (0.071) 0.21 (0.45)
TFP - ICT&Soft&DB 0.34 (0.21) 0.81*** (0.00026) 0.51* (0.054)
PL - ICT&Soft&DB 0.31 (0.26) 0.62** (0.015) 0.48* (0.071)
PK - ICT&Soft&DB 0.11 (0.71) 0.5* (0.058) 0.097 (0.73)
For each country, time averages of different productivities and investments growth rates have been cal-
culated for each of the three periods considered. Table 1 reports correlation coefficients and p-values (in
5
brackets) between the sets of investments and productivities time averages referred to all countries consid-
ered5. Asterisks points out statistically significant results6.
Significant results underline mostly positive correlations between variables. In particular, in the time
period 2008− 2014 the majority of the results turns out to be highly significant, highlighting a positive cor-
relation between productivity and investments. In this time period, TFP average growth rate is significantly
and positively correlated with total intangible, R&D, total tangible, ICT equipment and ICT&Soft&DB
investments average growth rates. Also labour productivity PL is highly and positively correlated with total
intangible, R&D and ICT&Soft&DB investments.
Even though the 1997−2007 time period is characterized mainly by positive relations among variables, we
did not find significant results except for the negative correlation between capital productivity and intangible
R&D investments average growth rates. In this respect, it is worth noting that capital productivity, measured
as the ratio between GDP and capital services, has been decreasing in most OECD countries for the past
twenty years, see OECD (2019), and this fact may have affected the result.
Fig. 2 show the correlation between TFP and total intangible investments average growth rates in the
1997− 2007 and 2008− 2014 time periods. The comparison of these two plots highlights an increase in the
correlation between variables in the 2008−2014 time period, even though the growth rates tend to be lower.
These considerations are true also for R&D and ICT&Soft&DB investments average growth rates, presented
in Figures 3 and 4. In 2008 − 2014 time periods, even though the positive correlation coefficient between
TFP and Soft&DB intangible investments is not significant, TFP turns out to be significantly and positively
correlated with the sum of Soft&DB and ICT equipment that has been called ICT&Soft&DB (the correlation
coefficient is equal to 0.81). This fact points out the complementary roles of hardware and software.
The higher correlation coefficients in the post-crisis period of 2008− 2014 might be explained along the
lines of the cleansing effect of recessions, introduced by Caballero and Hammour (1994). According to this
idea, recessions can be seen as times of ”cleansing,” when outdated or relatively unprofitable techniques and
products are pruned out of the productive system. Therefore, after the crisis of 2007, investments in new
technology induced a higher productivity growth with respect to the previous decade.
4. Modelling the digital transformation
4.1. Literature overview
Formalizing the digital transformation involving our society through a modelling approach turns out to
be crucial in order to forecast potential future consequences related to the advent of digital technologies. In
this respect, the debate on how to represent the potential effects deriving from their adoption in production
processes is still open. Current literature comprehends different methods that have been developed in order
to assess unemployment, productivity change and wage inequality deriving from digital transformation. One
of these is represented by including AI within production functions as a new (production) factor, see Hanson
(2001); Lankisch et al. (2019); DeCanio (2016).
Moreover, as pointed out by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d), several researchers have modelled the
introduction of automation and AI in the manufacturing sector as a factor augmenting technical change:
digital transformation is represented by an increase in factor productivities, see Acemoglu (2003). In this
respect, Nordhaus (2015); Graetz and Michaels (2018); Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012) frame automation and AI
impact as a capital-augmenting technical change, whereas Bessen (2016, 2018, 2019) represents automation
as labour-augmenting.
Conversely, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017, 2018a,b,c,d) point out some weaknesses of the factor aug-
menting approach in equilibrium models7 and they adopt the so-called task-based approach based on the
5Time series stationarity has been verified through a KPSS test.
6Assuming a null hypothesis of non-correlation we consider three different levels of significance: a single asterisk is used when
p-values are lower than 0.1 whereas two and three asterisks are used when p-values are lower than 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
7Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018d) argue that “factor-augmenting technologies have a limited scope to reduce the demand for
labor”. Another criticism made by authors refers to the impact of technology on labour share in national income: it is strictly
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Figure 2: The figure shows two scatter plots representing for countries under investigation two regressions between country
average TFP and total intangible investments growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different time periods:
1997-2007 (a) and 2008-2014 (b). The correlation index is equal to 0.082 (a) and 0.81 (b). Source: authors estimations based
on EU-KLEMS (www.euklems.net) and OECD (www.oecd.org) data.
pioneering contribution by Zeira (1998): automation advent is represented as an increase in the number of
tasks that can be performed by machines. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2017) develops AI through a task-based
model.
It is worth noting however that the criticism by Acemoglu and Restrepo holds in equilibrium models.
Building on the empirical analysis presented in the previous section showing a clear effect of investments in
ICT&Soft&DB on TFP, we have then developed a new extension of the well known large-scale macroeconomic
model Eurace, see Raberto et al. (2012); Teglio et al. (2012); Petrovic et al. (2017); Mazzocchetti et al. (2018);
Ponta et al. (2018); Teglio et al. (2019); Bertani et al. (2019). The disequilibrium hypothesis which is the
foundation of the agent-based modelling approach makes the caveat made by Acemoglu and Restrepo not
applicable to our model.
4.2. The Eurace model with intangible assets
The Eurace model is populated by several types of economic agents, characterised by limited capabilities of
computation and information gathering, which interact through different markets. Each agent is represented
as a dynamic balance sheet which contains the details regarding its assets and liabilities; see Godley and
Lavoie (2012); Raberto et al. (2018) for details. Most agents’ decisions occur at a weekly, monthly, quarterly,
or yearly periodicity, and are asynchronous.
The household (HH) operates in the financial market, labour market, goods market and housing market.
As a trader, it allocates its financial wealth among the available assets, which are bonds issued by the
government and stocks issued by firms and banks. As a worker, it receives a monthly salary, which constitutes,
along with the financial returns on bonds and stocks, the total income of the household. On the basis of total
income, households decide the consumption budget, according to a target wealth to income ratio, in line
with the buffer-stock saving behaviour theory, see Carroll (2001). Households’ decision about the product
to buy is driven by purchasing probabilities based on the price.
related to the elasticity of substitution between production factors. Conversely, task-based approach adopted by them “always
reduces the labor share and it reduces labor demand and the equilibrium wage unless the productivity gains from automation
are sufficiently large.”
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Figure 3: The figure shows two scatter plots representing for countries under investigation two regressions between country
average TFP and R&D investments growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different time periods: 1997-2007
(a) and 2008-2014 (b). The correlation index is equal to 0.041 (a) and 0.62 (b) respectively. Source: authors estimations based
on EU-KLEMS (www.euklems.net) and OECD (www.oecd.org) data.
The consumption good producer (CGP) produces and sells an homogeneous good, taking decisions about
the factors of production and how to finance them. In brief, once the CGP has estimated the expected
demand based on past sales, it determines the labour demand (posting new vacancies or firing) and the
investment level, by comparing the net present value of future additional cash flows with the current cost of
the investment. The CGP tries to finance these costs according to the pecking order theory: first retained
earnings, then debt, then equity. If rationed, the CGP reduces costs in order to make the total financial
needs consistent with the available resources. If insolvent, the CGP defaults and undergoes a restructuring
process to increase the equity over debt ratio.
The commercial bank (B) role in the model is to provide credit to private agents. The bank evaluates
loan requests by firms, and eventually offers the loan at a price that depends on the risk associated to the
default probability of the firm. A similar procedure is used by the bank to assess the creditworthiness of
households asking for mortgage loans (detail are in Ozel et al. (2019)). Bank’s lending is also limited by the
obligation to respect the minimum capital requirements enforced by Basel II regulation. It is worth noting
that money in the model is endogenous, as new deposits are created every time a bank issues new credit.
The other main agents in the model are the capital good producer (KGP), which produces investment
goods and sells them to CGPs, and the policy maker agents, which are in charge of economic policy and
regulation. In particular, the government (G) ensures a welfare system through fiscal policy. Taxes come
from corporate earnings, consumption (VAT), financial income and labour income. Government expendi-
tures include the public sector wage bill, unemployment benefits, transfers, and interest payment on debt.
On a monthly basis, if in short of liquidity, the government issues new bonds, which are perpetuities that
pay a monthly fixed coupon. The central bank (CB) provides liquidity in infinite supply to banks, acting as
lender of last resort. It also sets the policy rate according to a dual mandate rule, i.e., low unemployment
and stable prices, and the capital requirement for banking regulation.
Intangible digital assets consist in software or in any other digitalized knowledge-based assets, e.g.,
algorithms, advanced routines, instructions, which can support the production process. Intangible digital
assets are developed and supplied by a specific agent, namely the intangible digital assets developer (DAD),
and are employed by CGPs with the purpose of rising total factor productivity. Intangible digital assets are
heterogeneous among the different DADs, depending on their accumulated digital knowledge, which increases
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Figure 4: The figure shows two scatter plots representing for countries under investigation two regressions between country
average TFP and ICT&Soft&DB investments growth rates (%). Country averages are considered for two different time periods:
1997-2007 (a) and 2008-2014 (b). The correlation index is equal to 0.34 (a) and 0.81 (b) respectively. Source: authors estimations
based on EU-KLEMS (www.euklems.net) and OECD (www.oecd.org) data.
over time based on the R&D investments made. DADs compete among each other for providing firms with
new digital technology.
Intangible digital assets are assumed non-rivalrous, i.e., characterized by zero marginal production costs,
see e.g. Haskel and Westlake (2017). Production costs are given only by the R&D costs, which are determined
by the cumulated labor costs of the skilled labor force employed at any DAD agent. On a monthly basis,
each DAD has a chance to develop a new version of its digital asset, endowed with higher productivity when
employed in the production process by CGPs. The probability probd of a successful completion of the new
digital asset version depends on the cumulated person months Md employed by the DAD since the latest
version developed, as follows:
probd = 1−
1
1 + ηMd
(1)
where η is a shape parameter setting the development speed, i.e., the higher is η, the higher is the probability
to develop an improved version of digital assets, for any level of cumulated person months Md employed.
The rationale behind Eq. 1 is to set the probability as an increasing monotone function of the human efforts
devoted to R&D, but with decreasing returns to scale. It is also worth noting that R&D is modelled here as
an uncertain activity whose positive outcome is never granted in principle, since the probability is equal to
1 only asymptotically for an infinite number of person months. DADs determine the number of employees
monthly according to the DADs monthly turnover. This means that the number of employees in the DADs
sector is influenced not only by revenues, but also by the average wage in the economy.
Consumption good producers (CGPs) require digital assets in order to increase their productivity.
The production processes of the various companies have been modelled through a Cobb-Douglass production
function with constant return to scale as follows:
qCf = γfN
α
f K
1−α
f (2)
where Nf and Kf are the labour force employed and the capital endowment owned by a generic firm f ,
respectively, whereas γf represents the heterogeneous TFP. As reported in the previous section, our empirical
analysis shows that TFP is positively and significantly correlated with R&D and ICT&Soft&DB investments
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and, according to these findings, we model the impact of digital assets innovation on production processes
as total factor augmenting, namely increasing TFP value. Indeed, in our model the digital innovation is
determined by R&D activities performed by DADs and the high correlation characterizing TFP and R&D
investments growth rates leads us to hypothesize a total factor augmenting influence of these investments
on the mass production sector represented by CGPs. In particular, TFP γf of a generic firm f has been
modelled as follows:
γf = exp(1 + ηγκd) (3)
where ηγ is a scale parameter homogeneous across all CGPs while κd represents the digital asset adopted
productivity level. Each CGP can adopt only one kind of digital asset at a time and if the R&D activity of
the reference DAD is successful, κd will be increase by a fixed tick equal to δκ as reported in the following
relation:
κdt = κdt−1 + δκ (4)
The quantity of digital assets licenses required by CGPs is equal to the amount of capital units owned by
firms themselves. In other words, each capital unit is associated with a digital asset license. See Bertani
et al. (2019) for a more detailed description of the intangible Eurace extension.
4.3. Computational results
In order to evaluate the potential effects of digital assets technological progress on the economic system
and, in particular, on the labour market, we explore six different values of η, which is the innovation
probability function shape parameter. It is worth noting that η sets the success probability of R&D activity
performed by DADs: the higher the η value, the higher the probability to develop an improved version of
digital technology. Moreover, we consider also a “no intangible investments” case characterized by no digital
technologies innovation in order to have a wider perspective for analysis: it can be considered as the Eurace
baseline scenario. The methodology is based on Montecarlo computational experiments: we run twenty
simulations for each of the seven scenarios under investigation. Therefore, a total number of 140 simulations
has been considered in our analysis. According to the study methodology, we present ensemble averages
(and related standard errors) of time averages distributions over a twenty-years-long period of most relevant
variables for the seven scenarios investigated, see Table 2; furthermore, we plot some time series to provide
a more clear overview of the trajectories of relevant economic variables.
Table 2: For each variable and scenario considered, the table shows ensemble average (and related standard error in brackets) of
time averages distributions over a twenty-years-long time period. The variables reported are: average TFP (γf ), unemployment
level (%), average real wage (e), consumption goods sold quantity. The analysis takes into account six different values of η and
the case characterized by the absence of intangible investments.
Average γf Unempl. (%) Aver. real wage (e) Real consumption CGs price level
No Int Inv 1 (0) 2.76 (0.27) 2.68 (0.013) 9768 (75) 0.74 (0.005)
η = 0.05 1.61 (0.04) 1.79 (0.2) 3.54 (0.062) 13657 (289) 0.79 (0.02)
η = 0.1 2.0065 (0.058) 4.32 (0.56) 3.97 (0.073) 16290 (426) 0.68 (0.015)
η = 0.2 3.79 (0.2) 15.84 (1.84) 4.38 (0.098) 18391 (531) 0.62 (0.0068)
η = 0.3 5.016 (0.29) 25.18 (2.28) 4.36 (0.13) 17974 (590) 0.61 (0.0074)
η = 0.4 6.51 (0.32) 29.98 (2.096) 4.34 (0.11) 17997 (567) 0.6 (0.0097)
η = 0.5 6.76 (0.46) 35.18 (1.25) 4.04 (0.072) 16499 (297) 0.62 (0.0047)
Table 2 shows that digital assets average productivity (γf ) increases with η: the higher the value of η
the higher the endogenous rate of technological progress in the model, see also Fig. 5. Furthermore, this
higher digital assets productivity for high values of η leads to higher unemployment level in the economic
system. In fact, Fig. 6 shows that for high η values the “displacement effect” caused by digital technologies
increases dramatically: digital assets substitute workers in jobs that they previously performed in the mass
production industrial sector represented in the model by consumption good producers (CGPs). However,
for low η values (i.e. 0.05 and 0.1) the unemployment level is not extremely high.
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Figure 5: The figure shows various time series representing the digital assets average productivity or TFP (γf ) trend for each
scenario considered. All time series are representative of a typical trend and refer to the same seed of the pseudorandom number
generator.
It is worth noting that, as reported in Table 2, in case of no intangible investments, the unemployment
level tends to be higher compared to the case η = 0.05. This is related to the interaction of two different
effects: the “displacement effect” and the compensation mechanism “via additional employment in the
(digital) capital goods sector”, see Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a); Vivarelli (2014). The former refers to
the destruction of job places in the CGPs industrial sector, whereas the latter is related to the creation of
new job opportunities in the DADs industrial sector, see Table 3. For the lowest value of η, the compensation
mechanism is able to absorb effectively the unemployment generated by digital technologies in CGPs creating
also additional job places, while for higher value of η, “displacement effect” takes over on it leading in certain
case to mass unemployment.
Table 3: For each variable and scenario considered, the table shows ensemble average (and related standard error in brackets)
of time averages distributions over a twenty-years-long time period. The variables reported are: CGPs employment level (%),
DADs employment level (%), KGP employment level (%) and total capital stock owned by CGPs. The analysis takes into
account six different values of η and the case characterized by the absence of intangible investments.
CGPs empl. (%) DADs empl. (%) KGP empl. (%) CGPs total capital stock
No Int Inv 52.16 (0.31) 0 (0) 24.79 (0.44) 117346 (1407)
η = 0.05 44.31 (0.92) 16.42 (0.76) 17.18 (0.41) 95691 (925)
η = 0.1 39.073 (1.22) 17.89 (0.87) 18.42 (0.34) 99209 (816)
η = 0.2 27.5 (1.41) 21.37 (0.93) 14.99 (0.56) 92094 (1252)
η = 0.3 22.31 (0.92) 19.44 (1.23) 12.77 (0.53) 87821 (1705)
η = 0.4 20.18 (0.77) 18.033 (0.93) 11.51 (0.61) 84920 (1941)
η = 0.5 18.64 (0.48) 15.29 (0.73) 10.6 (0.36) 81568 (1345)
Table 3 shows a decrease in the CGPs employment level with the increase of η, and this is true also for
the capital good producer (KGP). In this respect, the higher digital assets productivity implies not only a
lower level of employment, but also a lower level of (hard) capital in the production processes and this is
why the KGP employment decreases with η, whose increase determines a higher endogenous technological
progress rate. As regards the DADs employment, it increases until η = 0.2, after that it starts to decrease.
This trend is related to the high average digital assets productivity which characterizes the economy for
high value of η. In fact, the number of licences sold by DADs is strictly related to the capital level inside
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Figure 6: The figure shows various time series representing the unemployment level trend for each scenario considered. All time
series are representative of a typical trend and refer to the same seed of the pseudorandom number generator.
the CGPs: the higher the productivity the lower the capital level inside CGPs and the lower the licenses
sold because each unit of capital is associated to a license, see Table 3. Therefore, for high value of η, the
technological progress affects negatively also the DADs. This fact highlights the complexity characterizing
the digital economy in which the various industrial sectors are interrelated with each other.
Table 2 shows an increase of the average real wage until η = 0.2, after that it starts to decrease slightly.
This increase in the real wage is strictly related to a decrease in the consumption goods price level. In fact,
firms set their prices through a mark-up pricing rule on unit costs and the higher productivity related to
digital technological progress allows CGPs to hire less workers reducing production costs. In other words,
Eurace is able to capture the so-called compensation mechanism “via decrease in price”: the costs reduction
leads to a prices decrease which in turn determines a higher demand of goods. However this compensation
mechanism is not able to counteract effectively the displacement effect in the CGPs industrial sector related
to the higher average TFP. Therefore, the lower consumption goods price level determines a higher CGPs
sold quantity, see Table 2, and comparing η scenarios, it emerges a strong relation between these two variables.
5. Concluding remarks
The research work has highlighted the growing importance that intangible digital investments are as-
suming in our economic system. First of all, we performed an empirical analysis taking into account various
European countries and USA data in order to asses the relationships between productivities (TFP, PL and
PK) and different kinds of tangible and intangible investments. This analysis shows a high positive and
significant correlation between TFP and two key investment kinds: ICT&Soft&DB and R&D.
According to these main empirical findings, we have presented a new Eurace extension in which invest-
ments in digital technologies affects TFP. This new version of Eurace is characterized by a new population of
agents: the digital assets developers (DADs). These new companies develop and supply a new type of digital
productive capital, which is required by CGPs in order to increase their TFP. R&D activities performed
each month by DADs lead to an innovation process inside the economic system, whose intensity turns out
to be crucial in order to understand the potential implications of digital technologies on labour market. In
this respect, even though compensation mechanisms counteract the displacement effect caused by digital
technologies in the traditional mass production system represented by CGPs, for high rate of technological
12
progress the unemployment increases dramatically. Going further with the model results analysis, the in-
creasing DADs employment level with higher levels of technological progress highlights a clear labour market
transformation: the economic system experiences a transition from a mass production economy to a digital
services one.
Both modelling and empirical results make us reflect on potential future scenarios deriving from this
intense digital transformation experienced by our society.
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